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Abstract
An artificial superintelligence (ASI) is artificial intelligence that is significantly more intelligent 
than humans in all respects. While ASI does not currently exist, some scholars propose that it 
could be created sometime in the future, and furthermore that its creation could cause a severe 
global catastrophe, possibly even resulting in human extinction. Given the high stakes, it is 
important to analyze ASI risk and factor the risk into decisions related to ASI research and 
development. This paper presents a graphical model of major pathways to ASI catastrophe, 
focusing on ASI created via recursive self-improvement. The model uses the established risk and
decision analysis modeling paradigms of fault trees and influence diagrams in order to depict 
combinations of events and conditions that could lead to AI catastrophe, as well as intervention 
options that could decrease risks. The events and conditions include select aspects of the ASI 
itself as well as the human process of ASI research, development, and management. Model 
structure is derived from published literature on ASI risk. The model offers a foundation for 
rigorous quantitative evaluation and decision making on the long-term risk of ASI catastrophe.
1. Introduction
An important issue in the study of future artificial intelligence (AI) technologies is the possibility
of AI becoming an artificial superintelligence (ASI), meaning an AI significantly more 
intelligent than humans in all respects. Computers have long outperformed humans in specific 
domains, such as multiplication. As AI advances, humans are losing in more and more domains, 
as seen in the recent Jeopardy! victory of IBM’s Watson computer. These AI can greatly help 
society, and also pose some risks, but they do not fundamentally change the status quo of 
humans being in ultimate control of the planet. However, some scholars propose that AIs could 
be designed that significantly exceed human capabilities, changing the status quo, with results 
that could be either fantastically good or catastrophically bad for the whole of humanity, 
depending on how the initial “seed” AI is programmed (Bostrom 2014; Good 1965; Yudkowsky 
2008). This proposition is controversial,1 but if true, the implications are enormous. Given the 
stakes, the proposition should be taken seriously even if it only has a small chance of being true 
(Ćirković 2012).
In this paper, we present a graphical model that depicts major pathways to catastrophe caused by 
ASI seizing control from humanity. We call the model the Artificial Superintelligence Pathways 
Model or ASI-PATH. The model’s pathways involve AIs that recursively self-improve, i.e. AIs 
that create successively more intelligent AIs via improvements to their hardware or software.2 
The model includes both the human process of building the AI and some aspects of the AI itself. 
1 Eden et al. (2012) present a range of perspectives on this controversy and related issues.
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The model uses established modeling paradigms from risk and decision analysis, namely fault 
trees and influence diagrams, in order to depict combinations of events and conditions that could 
lead to ASI catastrophe, as well as interventions that could avoid ASI catastrophe. Model 
structures are derived from published literature on ASI catastrophe risk. No attempt is made to 
quantify model parameters beyond the use of Boolean variables because many of the parameters 
are highly uncertain; quantifying them rigorously would require significant research beyond the 
scope of this paper. More generally, given that the broader study of ASI is young and in flux, we 
expect the ASI-PATH model to evolve in future work. The model presented here can thus be 
treated as ASI-PATH 1.0.
Even without quantified parameters, the models can serve as communication tools and guides for
actions to reduce ASI catastrophe risk. Furthermore, if parameter values are quantified, then the 
models can be used for quantitative risk analysis, technology forecasting and decision analysis. 
By characterizing the space of possible AI futures, the models help show, among other things: 
what could happen; where key points of uncertainty are; which short-term and medium-term 
precursor events to monitor; and what types of interventions could help avoid harmful outcomes 
and promote beneficial outcomes. The model presented here thus offers a foundation for rigorous
quantitative evaluation and decision making on the risk of ASI catastrophe.
In focusing on ASI catastrophe scenarios, we do not mean to imply that scenarios involving 
positive ASI outcomes are less important. A global-scale ASI catastrophe would clearly be 
important, but a global-scale positive ASI event could be similarly important, including because 
it could help address other global catastrophic risks. That said, much of the modeling presented 
in this paper can readily be extended to positive ASI scenarios.
The following section provides detailed background on the ASI scenarios, ASI risk-reduction 
interventions, and the modeling paradigms used in the paper. Section 3 presents the ASI-PATH 
model by showing a series of interconnected model sections. Section 4 concludes. An Appendix 
compiles definitions of select technical terms.
2. Conceptual Background
2.1 AI Catastrophe Scenarios
We focus on scenarios in which AI becomes significantly more intelligent and more capable than
humans, resulting in an ASI causing a major global catastrophe. Specifically, we focus on 
scenarios involving the following steps:
1) Humans create a seed AI that is able to undergo recursive self-improvement in either 
hardware or software.
2) The seed AI undergoes recursive self-improvement, resulting in a takeoff of successively 
more intelligent AIs.
3) The takeoff results in one or more ASIs.
4) The ASI(s) gain decisive strategic advantage over humanity, meaning “a level of 
technological and other advantages sufficient to enable it [the AI] to achieve complete world 
domination” (Bostrom 2014, p. 78).
2 Seed AI and recursive self-improvement are often used specifically to improvements in software (e.g, Bostrom 
2014), but we use the term more generally in deference to the possibility of improvements in hardware (e.g., Sotala 
& Yampolskiy 2015).
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5) The ASI(s) uses their decisive strategic advantage to cause a major global catastrophe, such 
as (but not necessarily limited to) human extinction.3
While other AI scenarios may also be able to bring great benefits or harms to humanity, this type
of scenario has been the subject of considerable scholarly and popular attention, enough to merit 
its own dedicated treatment.
We remain intentionally mute—with one important exception—on what qualifies as a major 
global catastrophe. The nature of major global catastrophe is a thorny moral issue, touching on 
issues such as the value of distant future generations.4 The ASI scenarios raise additional moral 
issues, such as whether the ASI itself could be inherently morally valuable. How these moral 
issues are resolved affects how specific seed AIs are to be evaluated, but it does not affect the 
modeling presented in this paper. The one exception—the one position this paper takes—
concerns the mere existence of superintelligence. We assume, for purposes of this paper and 
without committing our own views, that the mere existence of an ASI with decisive strategic 
advantage over humanity does not itself qualify as a major global catastrophe. In other words, 
this paper takes the position that it is not inherently catastrophic for humanity to lose control of 
its own destiny. We recognize that this is a contestable position, and in using this position in this 
paper we do not mean to advocate for it. Instead, we use this position in this paper because much
discussion of superintelligence effectively takes this position and because it makes for a 
reasonable starting point for analysis.
Similarly, we have no comment on the relative merits of various concepts for safe (or otherwise 
desirable) seed AI that have been proposed. These concepts have been discussed using terms 
such as “Friendliness” (Yudkowsky 2001; 2012), “safe AI scaffolding” (Omohundro 2012; 
2014), “AI safety engineering” (Yampolskiy & Fox 2013), and “motivation selection” (Bostrom 
2014). Distinguishing between these is also an important task but again beyond the scope of this 
paper. Instead, we use the generic term “safe AI” throughout the paper without reference to what 
qualifies as a safe AI and without intending preference for any particular “safe AI” concept. The 
modeling presented here is of sufficient generality that it could be applied to a wide range of 
conceptions of desirable outcomes and desirable seed AI.
2.2 Risk Reduction Interventions
Models like ASI-PATH can help people make better decisions towards ASI safety—that is, 
towards reducing the risk of ASI catastrophe. Each model component suggests opportunities to 
reduce this risk. The following bul leted list describes the risk reduction intervention options 
used in ASI-PATH. These are some (but not all) potential risk reduction intervention options, 
drawing heavily on Sotala and Yampolskiy (2015).  The interventions can be made by a range of 
actors, including governments, companies, universities, funding bodies, civil society, and AI 
researchers (including both ASI researchers and their colleagues in other branches of AI).
 ASI research risk review boards. Review boards would evaluate the riskiness of specific ASI 
research projects in order to steer research in less risky directions. The review boards could 
steer research, for example, by disallowing certain projects, directing funds away from riskier
3 Throughout the paper, we will for the sake of brevity often use “catastrophe” as shorthand for “major global 
catastrophe”.
4 On the moral importance of global catastrophes, see for example Matheny (2007), Bostrom (2013), Beckstead 
(2013).
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projects and towards safer ones, and establishing guidelines for publication. Successful 
review boards would need to correctly evaluate the riskiness of AI research, which could be 
difficult (Sotala & Yampolskiy 2015). Review boards might also be limited in the scope of 
research they review. A board set up by one country may not be able to review research 
conducted in other countries, though this could be addressed via international treaty (Wilson 
2013). Review boards could also overlook ASI projects that operate secretly (Sotala & 
Yampolskiy 2015).
 Encourage research into ASI safety. AI safety research can be on any aspect of ASI software 
or hardware, or on the humans involved in ASI development. ASI safety research could be 
encouraged, for example, by increasing funding for ASI safety research, creating open source
platforms for safe ASI development, or cultivating norms of responsibility among ASI 
researchers. Encouraging research can be an easier intervention to perform than something 
like review boards, because encouraging research can be done informally and outside 
institutional procedures. However, informal encouragement can sometimes be less effective 
when it lacks institutional clout. As with research risk review boards, encouraging research 
requires knowing whether a particular activity would increase or decrease ASI risks. 
 Enhance human capabilities. Human enhancement in this context refers to anything that 
could help humans keep up with AI, such that the AI does not gain decisive strategic 
advantage even during or after takeoff. Human capabilities could be enhanced, for example, 
via brain-computer interfaces or mind uploading. Human enhancement could reduce some 
ASI risks, but it could increase other ASI risks (e.g., if enhanced humans create unsafe ASI) 
or cause other problems (e.g., moral problems associated with modifying human nature). 
Additionally, human enhancement could require advanced technology that may not be 
developed before the seed AI, in which case human enhancement would not help with ASI 
safety.
 AI confinement. AI confinement measures are restrictions built into the AI’s hardware or 
software that limit the AI’s ability to affect the rest of the world so that it does not gain 
decisive strategic advantage.5 Confinement can be applied to the seed AI, the recursively 
self-improving AIs, or the ensuing ASI(s). For example, AI software could be designed such 
that the AI can only answer questions; this is known as “Oracle AI” (Armstrong, Sandberg &
Bostrom 2012). Another type of confinement would keep AI completely disconnected from 
the world, for example to test the AI’s safety (Yampolskiy & Fox 2013).6
 AI enforcement. AI enforcement occurs when one or more AIs prevent other AI(s) from 
gaining decisive strategic advantage. As with confinement, AI enforcement can be applied to 
seed AI, self-improving AIs, or ASIs; the enforcement can also be performed by any of these 
AIs, though more intelligent AIs may tend to be more effective enforcers. For AI 
5 Confinement and AI enforcement are types of containment, with containment being any measure to restrict the 
AI’s ability to affect the rest of the world such that the AI does not gain decisive strategic advantage. Other types of 
containment are measures taken by the rest of society and not built into the AI itself. We do not model these other 
types of containment as risk reduction interventions.
6 Goertzel and Pitt (2012) argue that, under some circumstances, connecting the AI to the world could increase 
safety. Even in such circumstances, keeping the AI disconnected would still qualify as confinement: confinement 
does not necessarily increase safety.
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enforcement to work, the AIs with strategic advantage must be motivated and able to stop 
other AIs. For scenarios with multiple AIs, there could be a first-mover advantage, such that 
the first AI(s) gain and keep strategic advantage. In such scenarios, the first AI(s) must be 
designed to conduct enforcement.
2.3 Fault Tree and Influence Diagram Modeling
ASI-PATH uses conventions from two established modeling paradigms: fault trees and influence
diagrams. Fault trees offer a simple but powerful method for modeling sets of interrelated 
possible scenarios. Fault trees have been used in modeling risks in a wide variety of contexts, 
including nuclear power plant safety (Rasmussen 1981), homeland security risk (Cheesebrough 
2010), nuclear war (Barrett, Baum & Hostetler 2013; Davis 1989), and other kinds of systems 
(Bedford & Cooke 2001; Kumamoto & Henley 1996). 
Fault trees represent the ways that events and conditions could combine to be at fault for causing 
a particular outcome, in this case an ASI catastrophe. Each node in the tree represents a 
particular event, such as an attempted creation of a seed AI, or a condition, such as the presence 
of some technology keeping the AI safe. The “top event” node in the tree represents the scenario 
outcome. Below the top node, the tree branches out with additional nodes corresponding to 
different ways that the top node can be reached. Each layer in the tree represents the combination
of events and conditions that could lead to the outcome in the layer directly above it. Nodes are 
connected by Boolean logic gates, such as OR, AND, and NOT gates. The tree thus shows a set 
of possible scenarios that could result in the top event.
Influence diagrams represent the ways that certain events can influence subsequent events. The 
events can be random variables, determined by factors external to the model, or decision 
variables, determined by decisions informed by the model. Influence diagrams thus can be 
thought of as Bayesian networks with the addition of decision nodes that represent variables 
whose values can be chosen instead of having a random value (Pearl 1988). Influence diagrams 
have been used for decades in decision analysis to inform business, government and other policy 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty (Clemen & Reilly 2001; Edwards, Miles & von 
Winterfeldt 2007). ASI-PATH uses influence diagrams to model the risk reduction interventions 
described in Section 2.2.
The figures in this paper use standard visual conventions for fault trees and influence diagrams. 
Connector lines are used to connect nodes representing events and conditions. Vertical 
connectors with no arrows are used for fault trees; the lower node is at fault for causing the upper
node. Horizontal connectors with arrows are used for influence diagrams; the left node 
influences the right node. Intervention options appear as unrounded rectangles with white text on
black background; in influence diagram terminology, these are called decision nodes. Other 
(non-intervention) events appear as rounded rectangles with black text on white background; 
these are called random-variable nodes. Some figures use both fault tree and influence diagram 
conventions, as well as both decision nodes and random-variable nodes.7
7 The use of white text on black background is not a standard influence diagram visual convention. We use it to 
further distinguish decision nodes from random-variable nodes in our figures.
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3. The Artificial Superintelligence Pathways Model 
3.1 Model Overview
Figure 1 presents the first three layers of ASI-PATH. The first two layers of Figure 1 should be 
fairly intuitive: an ASI catastrophe occurs if a seed AI takes off, resulting in a superintelligence 
with decisive strategic advantage over humanity, AND if the ASI’s actions are unsafe, such that 
it uses the decisive strategic advantage to cause catastrophe.8
Figure 1: ASI-PATH, fault tree top three layers
The third layer in Figure 1 contains more model detail: six conditions that must all be in place in 
order for ASI catastrophe to occur. If any of these conditions are missing, then there will be no 
AI takeoff, or the resulting ASI will not cause catastrophe. Starting on the left side: In order for a
seed AI to be created and have the capability to gain decisive advantage, three conditions must 
all be met:
Superintelligence from AI takeoff is possible. There is some debate about whether it could ever 
be physically possible for ASI to be created via recursive self-improvement. There is also debate 
on whether humans are capable of creating such ASI. For example, Bringsjord et al. (2012 pp. 
403-406) argue that it is far from certain that humans would ever be able to create AI with 
human-level intelligence, or that such an AI would be able to recursively create more-intelligent 
AI to arrive at superintelligence.
Seed AI is created. For ASI catastrophe to occur, there must be a project in which humans build a
seed AI capable of becoming superintelligent via recursive self-improvement. Such an AI is 
presumably not going to spontaneously materialize out of thin air. There are a variety of ways in 
which ASI projects could build a seed AI (Section 3.2).
Containment fails. If containment fails, then the ASI gains decisive strategic advantage. 
Containment measures could include takeoff limits, such that the seed AI does not begin 
recursive self-improvement, or such that successive AIs do not continue recursive self-
improvement so as to become superintelligent. Other containment measures could prevent a 
8 The model can be adapted for analyzing safe ASI by switching the layer 2 right node to “ASI actions are safe”; 
much of the lower-layer modeling (discussed below) will be similar.
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post-takeoff ASI from gaining decisive strategic advantage, for example via confinement, human
enhancement, or AI enforcement (Section 2.2).
Moving to the right side of Figure 1, third layer: In order for an ASI to have unsafe goals—in 
order for it to not use its decisive strategic advantage to cause catastrophe—three conditions 
must all be met:
Human attempts to make AI goals safe fail. Goal safety can potentially be built into an ASI by 
the AI designers. Indeed, some people are currently calling for ASI developers to make their 
AIs’ goals safe (Bostrom 2014; Yudkowsky 2012), and there is ongoing research into various 
ways to make ASI goals safe (Goertzel & Pitt 2012; Yampolskiy & Fox 2013). There is some 
debate about how to design safe ASI goals—more on this below.
AI does not make its own goals safe. Several people have suggested that AIs could make their 
own goals safe even if the goals were not designed to be safe (Hall 2011; Waser 2008). One 
possible reason could be that “minds which are intelligent enough will, due to game-theoretical 
and other considerations, become altruistic and cooperative” (Sotala & Yampolskiy 2015 p. 21). 
Others have disputed this point, arguing that without significant dedicated effort, catastrophe is 
likely to result (e.g., Bostrom 2014; Omohundro 2008; Omohundro 2012; 2014; Yampolskiy & 
Fox 2013; Yudkowsky 2001; 2012). For example, Omohundro (2008) argues that almost any 
simple goal, such as playing chess well, could be unsafe. The AI would cause catastrophe in its 
relentless pursuit of that goal, such as by hoarding the world’s resources to play a better game of 
chess.
ASI is not deterred from acting unsafely. To deter is to persuade another agent to refrain from 
taking some action by convincing the agent that the action is not in their own interest. Even if an 
ASI has decisive strategic advantage and unsafe goals, it potentially could still be deterred from 
using its advantage to cause catastrophe. However, Bostrom (2014) argues that an ASI with 
decisive strategic advantage would be undeterrable.
We now fill in some additional model details with additional fault tree layers, first for the 
possibility of limits to AI takeoff, then for human efforts to make the AI safe. The subsequent 
figures show some major relationships between decision nodes (rounded rectangles, black text 
on white background) and random-variable nodes (unrounded rectangles, white text on black 
background). The selection of relationships presented is not intended to be comprehensive. The 
decision nodes can influence other random-variable nodes besides those shown in the figures. 
There can also be other decision nodes representing other interventions not modeled in this 
paper. What is shown is intended only to be illustrative of how decision nodes can be used to 
incorporate risk reduction interventions in the ASI-PATH model.
3.2 Seed AI Creation
A critical question is how and when an AI research and development project could build a seed 
AI. When the seed AI is created matters for several reasons. Earlier creation could make takeoff 
slower and easier to contain (Section 3.3), but earlier creation also gives less opportunity to 
design a safe seed AI.
Figure 2 presents additional detail on seed AI creation, extending the “Seed AI is created” node 
from Figure 1. Figure 2 shows two major types of seed AI: AI of novel design and whole brain 
emulation. Figure 2 also has a catch-all “other seed AI” branch for any types of seed AI that do 
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Figure 2: Detail on seed AI creation
8
not fit into the two major types. This section of the model draws heavily on Bostrom (2014, ch. 
2).
AI of novel design refers to seed AI whose design is at least novel relative to the human brain. In 
other words, the seed AI design is at least in part not based on the human brain. Four different 
pathways to seed AI of novel design are modeled:
(1) Artificial general intelligence (AGI) in this context is seed AI with approximately human-
level or greater general intelligence—that is, at approximately human-level or greater 
intelligence in all respects (e.g., Goertzel & Pennachin 2007).9 Since humans are capable of 
programming better AIs, an AI at least as smart as humans in all respects would also be able to 
program better AIs, thereby beginning a recursive self-improvement process (Bostrom 2014; 
Sotala 2012). The AGI model branch contains a lower layer to model one pathway to AGI that 
has been identified, which comes from networks or organizations of AIs, for example if “the 
Internet might one day ‘wake up’” (Bostrom 2014, p. 49). The lower layer also includes a catch-
all “other AGI” node.
(2) Self-improvement specialist is seed AI that is “sub-human in most respects, but with a 
domain-specific talent for coding and AI research” (Bostrom 2014, p. 29). In other words, the AI
is a specialist in recursive self-improvement. For example, Sotala (2012) and Bostrom (2014) 
discuss ways in which superintelligence could be achieved by AI with initially subhuman general
intelligence but greater than human ability to take control of other networked systems, make 
copies of itself, and to coordinate between copies of itself. 
(3) Neuromorphic AI is seed AI that is based in part, but not entirely, on the human brain: a 
partial brain emulation. For example, neuromorphic AI could be based on human patterns of 
cognition while lacking human motivations; the difference in motivations could make it harder to
achieve goal safety.
(4) Other novel design, a catch-all node for any pathways to novel seed AI designs that do not fit 
into the three identified pathways.
Moving on to the second major branch of Figure 2—the second major type of seed AI:
Whole brain emulation is seed AI that emulates the entirety of the human brain (Alstott 2014; 
Sandberg & Bostrom 2008). Because the human brain is capable of designing AIs, a whole brain 
emulation AI presumably could also design AIs. A whole brain emulation AI could also self-
improve by using more and faster hardware, something that biological human brains cannot 
readily do. By imitating the human brain, whole brain emulation may require less intellectual 
breakthrough than seed AI of novel design—it “relies less on theoretical insight and more on 
technological capability” (Bostrom 2014, p. 33).
Whole brain emulation requires each of three steps to occur:
(1) Scanning, in sufficiently detail, of one or more whole human brains. The brain scan creates 
an image of the whole brain to be emulated.
(2) Translation, using data analysis and image processing, to construct digital representation(s) 
of the brains neuronal network and/or any other relevant information. The translation thus 
converts the scanned image into a format that can be emulated.
9 The term AGI can refer to more than just seed AI. Indeed, an ASI built from a seed AGI would likely also be an 
AGI, as the AI is unlikely to lose general intelligence as it undergoes recursive self-improvement.
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(3) Simulation, which creates a whole brain emulation seed AI based on the whole brain 
translation.
Figure 2 shows the decision node “Review Boards” (i.e., ASI research risk review boards) 
influencing each of the model section bottom nodes. Review boards could evaluate the safety of 
each type of seed AI development project. For projects found to be unsafe, review boards could 
recommend that the projects stop their work or that funders stop funding the projects. Such a 
board would be analogous to, for example, the review of risky biomedical research (“dual use 
research of concern” or DURC) by the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS; see e.g., OBA 2012; Patterson, Tabak, Fauci, Collins & Howard 2013). The DURC 
review helps determine whether HHS (which includes the National Institutes of Health) funds 
the research and what safety procedures the research must follow.
Figure 2 shows separate arrows pointing to each of the bottom nodes instead of one arrow 
pointing to the top node (“Seed AI is created”) because the influence of Review Boards can be 
different for each bottom node. That is, Review Boards could have different influence on 
different types of seed AI project. For example, perhaps Review Boards are more effective for 
neuromorphic AI, which could require large dedicated projects, and less effective for networked 
AI, which could emerge from entrenched infrastructure (e.g., the Internet). The use of separate 
arrows illustrates how this model section would be coded, with different influence relations for 
different bottom nodes.
3.2 AI Containment
Containment is defined in this paper as any measure that restricts an AI such that it does not 
result in an ASI gaining decisive strategic advantage. The restriction can be on seed AI, self-
improving AI, or ASI. Figure 3 models some key details about containment, extending the 
“Containment fails” node in Figure 1.
Working down from the top of Figure 3, containment fails if takeoff limits fail or if 
superintelligence containment fails. In other words, an ASI gains decisive strategic advantage if 
a seed AI takes off, becoming superintelligent, and if the resulting ASI is not contained.
Starting on the left branch of Figure 3, AI takeoff limits fail if either hard takeoff limits fail or 
soft takeoff limits fail, simply because these are the two types of takeoff:
(1) Hard takeoff limits fail. A hard takeoff proceeds rapidly, with no opportunity for human 
intervention. Figure 3 models three hard takeoff scenarios (i.e., failures of hard takeoff limits): 
(1) hardware quantity, in which the AI takes off rapidly due to an abundance of available 
hardware (also known as hardware overhang; see Sotala and Yampolskiy 2015); (2) hardware 
quality, in which the AI rapidly develops faster hardware (also known as speed explosion; see 
Sotala and Yampolskiy 2015); and (3) software quality, in which the AI rapidly develops smarter
AI software (also known as intelligence explosion; see Sotala and Yampolskiy 2015).
(2) Soft takeoff limits fail. A soft takeoff proceeds slowly, permitting significant human 
intervention in the takeoff process. Figure 3 models three soft takeoff scenarios (i.e., failures of 
soft takeoff limits): (1) hardware quantity, in which the AI takes off due to gradually increasing 
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Figure 3: Detail on containment failure
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its amount of available hardware;10 (2) hardware quality, in which AI takes off due to gradually 
develops faster hardware; and (3) software quality, in which the AI gradually develops smarter 
AI software.
Takeoff speed is important because it strongly affects how much opportunity there will be to 
manage the recursive self-improvement process. If a hard takeoff is more likely, then it is 
especially important to design the seed AI so as to achieve desirable outcomes, because there 
will be no opportunity to adjust the AI once takeoff begins. Shulman and Sandberg (2010) and 
Goertzel and Pitt (2012) suggest that a soft takeoff would be more likely if the seed AI is created 
earlier, because the hardware, programming languages, etc. available for the AI would tend to 
result in slower seed AI. Thus to the extent that the seed AI creation model section (Section 3.2) 
can indicate when seed AI may be created, this can inform the success of containment.
Figure 3 shows the decision node “Enhance Humans” (i.e., enhance human capabilities) 
influencing the three random-variable nodes below “Soft takeoff limits fail”. In principle, 
enhancing human capabilities could help with a wide range of AI safety measures, but it could be
especially useful for limiting soft takeoff. This is because soft takeoff involves AIs gradually 
gaining capabilities; enhanced humans may be able to keep up with the AI during much of the 
takeoff, ensuring that no unsafe ASI gains decisive strategic advantage. In comparison, a hard 
takeoff would by definition occur too quickly for even enhanced humans to keep up.
As with Figure 2, Figure 3 shows separate arrows pointing to each of the bottom nodes instead of
one arrow pointing to the top node (“Soft takeoff limits fail”) because the influence of Enhance 
Humans can be different for each bottom node—for each type of soft takeoff. For example, 
perhaps Enhance Humans is more effective for containing hardware quality soft takeoff than for 
containing software quality soft takeoff, because enhanced humans could control the AI’s access 
to the physical equipment necessary for hardware production. As with Figure 2, the use of 
separate arrows illustrates how this model section would be coded, with different influence 
relations for different bottom nodes.
Moving on to the right branch of Figure 3, superintelligence containment fails if there is no 
superintelligence containment or if the AI escapes whatever superintelligence containment is 
used:
(1) ASI is created without superintelligence containment. Some ASI development projects might 
not use any superintelligence containment. This could happen for example if the developers have
no ability to use superintelligence containment, or if they believe the superintelligence 
containment would not work, or if they want the ASI to gain decisive strategic advantage. 
Whatever the reason, ASI cannot be confined if there is no superintelligence containment.
Figure 3 shows the decision node “Review Boards” (i.e., ASI research risk review boards) 
influencing the node “ASI is created without superintelligence containment”. Review boards 
could monitor ASI R&D projects and require them to have some sort of containment.
(2) ASI escapes superintelligence containment. Superintelligence containment might not be 
designed and implemented well, and even world-class superintelligence containment may fail to 
contain some ASIs. Bostrom (2014 pp. 129-131, 145-148, 283) discusses many potential ways 
10 One might argue that a “hardware quantity” soft takeoff is unlikely on grounds that if an AI is able to access more 
hardware than its designers intended, it would likely be able to access much or all of the entire world’s hardware all 
at once, causing a hard takeoff. While quantifying scenario probabilities is beyond the scope of this paper, such 
probabilities can be plugged directly into the model.
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an ASI could escape containment, including persuading or tricking any gatekeepers who can 
remove containment, using methods of interacting with the outside world that containment 
designers failed to anticipate, or pretending to malfunction so that the containment is at least 
temporarily disabled.
Figure 3 shows the decision nodes “AI confinement” and “AI enforcement” influencing the 
random-variable node “AI escapes superintelligence containment”. AI confinement and AI 
enforcement are two types of superintelligence containment, so this influence relation follows 
from basic logic.
3.3 Human Attempts at Making ASI Goals Safe
Modeling ASI goal safety is a subtle and challenging task because there is no clear consensus on 
what it takes to make ASI goals safe. The study of ASI goal safety is, we think it is fair to say, in 
early stages, with a lot of uncertainty and disagreement. Because of this, one cannot model ASI 
goal safety with much specificity, or at least not with much confidence about the specifics. 
Therefore, the models in this section are intended as exploratory, in order to illustrate some of 
what is known and to promote open discussion with an eye toward future work. We expect to 
change these models pending such discussion and pending results of ongoing research on ASI 
goal safety.
3.3.1 General Failure Types
Figures 4-7 model general types of failure of human attempts at making ASI goals safe. Figure 4 
models two major lines of current thinking about how humans could make ASI goals safe. The 
two lines of thinking are the left and center nodes of layer 2, with the right node being a catch-all
category for any other lines of thinking:
Figure 4: Two lines of thinking on human attempts at making AI goals safe
(1) Failure of attempts involving mathematical proof. Some people involved in ASI goal safety 
research have called for goal safety measures to be built into the seed AI, and furthermore for the
correctness of these measures to be mathematically proven before the AI is launched. For 
example, ASI developers could build in goal stability, such that the AIs goals would not change 
as it undergoes recursive self-improvement. It may be possible to mathematically prove goal 
stability prior to launch.11 Mathematical proofs may be able to give AI designers and other 
observers a high confidence that the ASI’s goals would be safe, though it would not guarantee 
11 For discussion of this and related ideas, see for example Yampolskiy and Fox (2013), Omohundro (2012; 2014), 
Soares and Fallenstein (2014), and Russell et al. (2015). Details of failure modes for these ASI goal safety measures 
could be modeled in extensions of Figure 3.
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safety with 100% probability (Brundage 2014; Muehlhauser 2013). Requiring mathematical 
proofs before launch could also delay launch, by creating an additional hurdle that must be 
cleared before the seed AI is launched. Given that the failure of ASI goal safety could result in 
major global catastrophe, requiring mathematical proofs before launching is thus in the spirit of 
the precautionary principle, a major policy paradigm for risky emerging technologies.12 Finally, 
note that this line of thinking does not exclude goal safety measures that occur after seed AI 
launch.
(2) Failure of attempts involving AI biasing during takeoff but not involving mathematical 
proofs. Other people in ASI goal safety research have argued against mathematical proofs prior 
to seed AI launch, and instead argue for biasing the AI’s goals towards safety as the AI 
recursively self-improves. This line of thinking argues that the AI’s goals could be biased 
through human interaction with the AI as it grows and learns, using reward and punishment from
a trainer/biaser in a fashion somewhat analogous to what human children experience from their 
parents (Goertzel & Pitt 2012). Such AI biasing requires a soft takeoff; otherwise human 
interaction during takeoff would be impossible. Because mathematical proofs before launch are 
not sought, this line of thinking could enable earlier launch of the seed AI. There could be 
reasons for favoring earlier launch, for example in the context of a race between competing AI 
projects. However, supporters of requiring mathematical proofs have argued that the belief that 
proofs are unnecessary might give AI designers a dangerous misperception that an AI’s goals 
would remain safe outside its training environment (Sotala & Yampolskiy 2015 pp. 21-23).
(3) Failure of other types of attempts. This node is a catch-all for any attempt at ASI goal safety 
that does not involve either mathematical proofs or biasing during takeoff. While other types of 
attempts are, to our knowledge, not prominent in ASI goal safety literature, there may 
nonetheless be other types of attempts that could achieve ASI goal safety.
Each of the three nodes in the second layer of Figure 4 have a lower box labeled X. The X box is
a model module, essentially an abbreviation for a repeating model section. The abbreviation X is 
used to conserve space in the diagram, with no implications for the underlying model logic. We 
refer to this as a model module by analogy to modular computer programming. If the model is 
written in computer code, then modular programming could be used for X. The details of X are 
shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Explanation of the X module used in Figure 4
12 On the precautionary principle in the context of catastrophic risk, see for example Posner (2004); Sunstein (2009).
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Figure 5 shows that the X module has five nodes connected by an OR gate, each with a new 
module Y beneath it. The five nodes are:
No attempt, meaning no attempt is made at ASI goal safety using the types of attempt shown in 
Figure 4.
Theory failure, meaning a failure to achieve ASI goal safety due to some flaw in the theory of 
the type of goal safety attempted. Theory failure could be due, for example, to a philosophical 
mistake, such as selecting a goal that turns out to be unsafe, as in an ASI that causes catastrophe 
in the relentless pursuit of better chess (Omohundro 2008).
Implementation failure, meaning a failure to correctly implement the ASI goal safety technique 
in the actual AI. Implementation failure could be due to such things as a coding error or a 
hardware glitch.
Adversary failure, meaning the ASI goals become unsafe due to interference by some sort of 
adversary. The adversary could be a rogue member of the AI R&D team, an external party such 
as a competing ASI team or a misguided governing body, or another AI, as in AI enforcement.
Other failure, a catch-all for failure modes not covered in the other four nodes.
Each of the five Figure 5 nodes has a module Y beneath it. Module Y is shown in Figure 6. 
Module Y contains two nodes connected by an OR gate: failure before and during takeoff. Some 
ASI goal safety measures must be taken before takeoff, such as those involved in designing and 
coding the seed AI. Other safety measures must be taken after takeoff, such as those involving 
interacting with the AI so that its self-improvement proceeds in a safe direction.
Figure 6: Explanation of the Y module used in Figure 4
Figure 6 shows the decision node “Encourage Safety” (i.e., encourage research into AI safety) 
influencing the bottom random-variable nodes in Figure 6. These influence relations indicate that
Encourage Safety could influence all types of human attempts at making ASI goals safe. ASI 
goal safety is not the only type of AI safety that one could encourage, but it is a notable type. 
Active efforts exist to promote ASI goal safety research, accompanied by arguments that this is 
an especially important task for improving ASI outcomes (e.g., Muehlhauser & Bostrom 2014).
The use of separate arrows pointing to each of the bottom nodes in Figure 6 is analogous to the 
use of separate arrows in Figures 2 and 3: to indicate that the influence can be different for 
different bottom nodes. Because of the X and Y modules, the bottom nodes in Figure 6 are each 
repeated 15 times, meaning that there are 30 different Encourage Safety influence relations. 
Code of this model section could have different relations for each of the 30 bottom nodes. For 
example, perhaps it is relatively effective to encourage safety for “Failure of attempts involving 
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mathematical proof”—“No attempt”—“Failure before takeoff” because before takeoff, it is 
relatively easy to encourage ASI developers to make at least some attempt at mathematical 
proofs, and perhaps it is relatively ineffective to encourage safety for “Failure of attempts 
involving AI biasing during takeoff but not involving mathematical proofs”—“Theory 
failure”—“Failure during takeoff” because after takeoff, there might not be enough time to 
develop adequate theory.
3.3.2 Specific Safety Measures
Figure 7 presents a different format for modeling human attempts to make ASI goals safe. 
Instead of organizing the attempts by lines of thinking and general failure types, as in Figures 4-
6, Figure 7 organizes the attempts by the specific safety measures the attempts could involve. 
Figure 7 thus aims to model the details of what goal safety requires. The goal safety measures are
grouped into two categories: measures built into the seed AI before its launch and measures 
taken during takeoff. This categorization assumes that no human attempts could succeed after 
takeoff, since then the AI would be superintelligent and presumably impervious to human 
interventions.
Figure 7: AI goal safety measures
Figure 7 includes four types of safety measures that could be built into the seed AI before 
takeoff: (1) goal safety, meaning safety measures that result in the post-takeoff superintelligence 
having safe goals;13 (2) goal stability, meaning the AI keeps the same goals throughout recursive 
self-improvement; (3) openness to training/bias during takeoff, such as to permit “attempts 
involving AI biasing during takeoff but not involving mathematical proofs” (Figure 3 and 
above);14 and (4) other seed AI measures, a catch-all category for any other safety measures that 
could be built into the seed AI. 
Figure 7 uses two “AND/OR?” logic gates. The reason for this unusual logic structure is because
it is not clear whether the logic gates should be ANDs or ORs, and indeed they potentially could 
be either. The “AND/OR?” gates are thus a representation of model uncertainty, analogous to the
13 Goal safety does not require the seed AI or subsequent pre-superintelligence AIs to have safe goals—thus 
included here are ideas like “coherent extrapolated volition” (Yudkowsky 2004) in which AI acquires safe goals 
during takeoff.
14 See also Soares (2015) for a characterization of openness to training: “corrigibility”, which an AI system would 
possess “if it cooperates with what its creators regard as a corrective intervention, despite default incentives for 
rational agents to resist  attempts to shut them down or modify their preferences.”
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use of probability distributions for parameter uncertainty. Likewise, the gates can be coded by 
considering each combination of AND and OR, perhaps with a probability assigned to each 
combination. 
For the top logic gate:
 An AND gate would be used if, in order for the top node failure to occur, it is necessary for 
both layer 2 node failures to occur. That would mean that ASI goal safety could be achieved 
either via building measures into the seed AI or by taking measures during takeoff. For 
example, if the seed AI can be made safe before launch, then additional measures during 
takeoff might not be necessary. Indeed, if the takeoff is hard, then there may not be 
opportunity for additional measures during takeoff, and goal safety would depend on safety 
measures built into the seed AI.
 An OR gate would be used if, in order for the top node failure to occur, it is sufficient for 
either of the layer 2 node failures to occur. That would mean that AI goal safety would 
require measures built into the seed AI and measures taken during takeoff. For example, for 
an AI to be biased towards safe goals during takeoff, it might need certain safety measures 
built into the seed AI, such as openness to training/biasing during takeoff.
For the bottom logic gate:
 An AND gate would be used if, in order for the top node failure to occur, it is necessary for 
all four bottom node failures to occur. That would mean that pre-takeoff ASI goal safety 
could be achieved via any one of the four safety measures. For example, if the seed AI is 
open to bias/training during takeoff, then it may not need to have safe or stable goals before 
takeoff, as its goals can be adjusted during takeoff.
 An OR gate would be used if, in order for the top node failure to occur, it is sufficient for any
of the four bottom node failures to occur. That would mean that AI goal safety would require 
all four safety measures to be built into the seed AI before takeoff. For example, goal safety 
may be useless if the goals are not also stable, because the goals would become unsafe during
takeoff.
4. Conclusion
It is far from certain that ASI will ever be built, or that, if it is built, it will result in catastrophe. 
But given the stakes—given the extreme severity of the catastrophe that could result—ASI 
catastrophe risk merits careful analysis and management. The ASI-PATH model presented in 
this paper is one step towards ASI risk analysis and risk management decision-making. ASI-
PATH uses fault trees and influence diagrams, which are established risk and decision analysis 
methodologies with a long history of success at informing risk management decisions. This 
history, and the experience it has generated, is leveraged in ASI-PATH for the analysis of ASI 
risk.
One might think that ASI is such a novel risk that established methodologies would not be 
suitable. ASI risk does indeed have some significant novel characteristics, in particular the 
possibility of humans losing control to the ASI. However, core aspects of ASI risk are broadly 
similar to other risks. ASI risk involves sets of pathways, events, and conditions involving 
interactions between humans and the technologies they develop. Analysis of ASI catastrophe 
pathways is thus not fundamentally different from analysis of pathways to other technology 
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catastrophes. This is good news, because it makes analysis of ASI catastrophe risk an easier 
endeavor.
That said, ASI catastrophe risk remains poorly understood. These are early days for the study of 
ASI risk. The ASI-PATH model presented here and the understanding of ASI risk it represents 
are both likely to evolve as the field matures. This is to say that the ASI-PATH model is wrong
—but then again, all models are wrong. Models like ASI-PATH can still be useful by helping 
people better understand the underlying risk, including the major points of uncertainty. For 
example, the modeling in this paper suggests that one key uncertainty is the combination(s) of 
measures needed to make ASI goals safe, hence the model uncertainty (“AND/OR?” gates) 
depicted in Figure 7. To the extent that future research could reduce the uncertainty, it would be 
of value for understanding ASI risk and informing ASI risk management decisions.
An important task for future work is the quantification of ASI-PATH parameters using real-
number values instead of Boolean logic. Doing so would enable the evaluation of ASI risk and 
specific risk reduction interventions, towards the goal of taking the most effective actions to 
reduce ASI risk. Quantifying ASI-PATH parameters is a delicate task due to the significant 
uncertainty that exists about parameter values, but this only means that quantification should 
proceed carefully, not that it should not proceed. Indeed, given the stakes associated with ASI 
catastrophe and the corresponding opportunities for reducing ASI catastrophe risk, the entire 
study of ASI catastrophe risk should be a significant research priority.
Appendix A: Glossary of Key Terms
This paper uses a lot of terminology, including many ordinary words used to refer to specific 
technical concepts. To aid the reader, here is a glossary of key terms as they are used in this 
paper. We have strived for consistency with prior literature, though this paper may have some 
unique terminology or definitions.
An AI system includes the AI software (“the AI itself”) and the hardware it runs on, including 
hardware it uses for sensory input (e.g., cameras), external communications (e.g., monitors 
displaying text messages), and any other external interactions (e.g., robot arms).
Confinement is any measure built into an AI system that restricts its ability to affect the rest of 
the world such that the AI does not gain decisive strategic advantage. Confinement measures by 
definition do not affect the rest of the world, or at least do not affect it to any significant extent. 
For example, putting the AI in a metal box to shield its radio emissions could be considered 
confinement even if the rest of the world would be affected by having to purchase and install the 
box. Confinement measures can be either hardware (e.g., a metal box) or software (e.g., code that
prevents the AI from physically moving objects).
Containment is any measure that restricts an AI system’s ability to affect the rest of the world 
such that the AI does not gain decisive strategic advantage. Containment includes measures built 
into the AI system (i.e., confinement) as well as measures involving the rest of the world (e.g., AI
enforcement).
Goal safety refers to safety measures built into AI software giving the AI goals such it does not 
use decisive strategic advantage to cause major global catastrophe. AI goal safety is similar, but 
not necessarily equivalent, to established concepts such as “Friendliness” (Yudkowsky 2001; 
2012) and “motivation selection” (Bostrom 2014).
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Safety is any measure applied in any way to an AI system that reduces the risk of the AI causing 
a major global catastrophe. Safety thus includes measures to prevent humans from launching a 
seed AI (e.g., research review boards), measures to prevent the seed AI or any subsequent AI 
from gaining decisive strategic advantage (e.g., takeoff limits), and measures to prevent a 
superintelligent AI from using decisive strategic advantage to cause major global catastrophe 
(i.e., goal safety).
Takeoff limits are measures that restrict an AI’s ability to recursively self-improve. Takeoff limits
can be used for containment or for other purposes (e.g., the scientific study of takeoff dynamics).
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